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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LE ROY SWEAT AND VIRGINIA M. 
SWEAT, ADMINISTRITRIX OF THE' 
ESTA TE OF BLAINE ORVEL 
SWEAT, DECEASED, 
VS. 
Appelwnts Case No. 11,596 
REX T. FUHRIMAN, CRAIG 
IWHRIMAN, JAMES H. MADDOX 
and DAN ALLISON, 
ReS'[Jondents 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Order for Summary Judgment of the 
District Court of Wasatch County, 
Hon. Maurice Harding, District Judge 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE , 
This is an action1 for wrongful death brought by the 
parents of the deceased, Blaine Orvel Sweat. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respective parties all filed motions for summary 
judgment and the court denied plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment and granted summary judgment for the 
defendants. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have their motion for summary 
judgment granted or that the matter be sent back for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Appellants contend that on Saturday night, May 18, 
1968, defendant Craig Fuhriman, age 21, and the son of 
Defendant Rex T. Fuhriman1 who was also the owner of 
the car Craig was driving, was returning from a fishing 
trip to Flaming Gorge with David Lund as his companion. 
They ran out of gas on Highway US 40 about 22 miles East 
of Heber City, Utah, at approximately 11:00 p.m. 
This is the spot where the accident later happened. 
The road is generally straight and level in each direction. 
Toward the East there was visability from the stalled car 
for about one and six-tenths (1.6) miles and toward the 
West there was visability for approximately one-half mile. 
The highway was divided into two lanes by paint marks 
down the center. At this time of night the traffic was light 
and the weather was clear and the road dry. 
Defendanrt Craig Fuhriman and Lund hitched a ride 
to Heber City. No lights were left burning on the Fuhriman 
vehicle. They stopped at a Conoco station and asked the 
attendant for help in getting gas for their car. 
Defendant James H. Maddox had taken the family 
car and gone to Price. He left a Jeep with his son, Steven 
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Maddox. Steven loaned the Jeep to Rickie Lee Allison, a 
sixteen year old boy and brother-in-law of James H. 
Maddox. 
Rickie Lee Allison and Blaine Orvel Sweat, also sixteen 
years of age, had been! to the local high school dance and 
stopped at a cafe adjacent to the service station. The sta-
tion attendant asked Allison to assist Fuhriman. Allison 
agreed but indicated they would first have to take their 
dates home. This was done and Allison and Sweat returned 
to the Conoco station but there was no gas can at the sta-
tion which could be used to transport gas. 
The four boys then went in the Maddox Jeep, with Alli-
son driving, to a service station at the Strawberry Junction, 
passing the Fuhriman vehicle on the way. There they 
awoke the attendant but he also did not have a gas can. 
The Allison boy said he had a second gas tank on the Jeep. 
Fuhriman then purchased $2.00 worth of gasoline which 
was put in the second gas tank. The four then returned, 
Allison driving, to the Fuhriman car. They went past it a 
short distance, made a U turn and returned and parked 
parallel with the Fuhriman car so the gas tanks were even. 
The Fuhriman vehicle was facing West toward Heber City 
and the Maddox Jeep was facing East toward Vernal. 
There is a dispute as to whether the Fuhriman! car was 
completely off the black-top of the road or whether the left 
wheels were on the paved portion. The Jeep was in the 
West lane of traffic facing on-coming traffic. Four yellow 
blinker lights on the Jeep were turned on and its head 
lights were on bright. There were about two or three feet 
between the two parked vehicles. Craig FuhrimanJ got out 
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of the back end of the Jeep to watch for on-coming traffic. 
The Allison boy started to siphon gas out but got his 
mouth full of gas and started to cough and choke. Sweat 
then picked up the siphone hose, and while standing be-
tween the two vehicles started to siphon gas from one 
car to the other. 
It was now early Sunday morning, May 19, 1968. The 
party of four had been there about five minutes when a car 
driven by Mr. Sargent ran into the two parked vehicles. 
Allison was killed outright and Sweat lived a few days in 
a hospital before dying. He never regained consciousness 
enough to talk. Fuhriman and Lund were also injured but 
have recovered. 
POINT I 
DEFEDANT DAN ALLISON IS LIABLE FOR NEG-
LIGIDNCE OF RICKIE LEE ALLISON. 
Dan Allison signed the drivers license of his son, 
Rickie Lee Allison. Thus under the provisions of Section 
41-2-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, he is liable for Rickie's 
conduct in the operation of the Jeep. 
POINT II 
RICKIE LEE ALLISON'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DEATH OF BLAINE OR· 
VELSWEAT. 
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Rickie Lee Allison was the driver at all times of the 
Jeep and he is the one who agreed to help the stranded 
motorists. The depositions reveal that the Sweat boy never 
at any time agreed to any action or conduct of Fuhriman 
or Allison. He was an innocent bystander caught in a situ-
ation where common courtesy demands and requires that 
he does not interfere with the help requested by Fuhriman. 
Allison parked the Jeep on a highway blocking a lane 
of traffic. Allison turned the Jeep to face on-coming traffic 
with four yellow blinker lights and the head lights on 
bright. (See the deposition of Trooper Giles, page (9), lines 
(15) through (17), and a statement of Harold J. Sargent. 
Allison failed to give any warning to approaching 
traffic. The road was straight for 1.6 miles (Deposition of 
Trooper Giles, page (26) lines (1) through (5). This would 
give time to signal on-coming traffic or for a driver to see 
any signal of warning properly given. 
POINT III 
THE GUEST STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS 
CASE. 
The guest statute applies to persons riding in a motor 
vehicle. This is repeated time and again in the statute, 
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Some cases have extended the statute to cover mount-
ing and alighting from a motor vehicle but none have ex-
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tended it so far as to include a fact situation like the pres-
ent case. The journey for the time had ended, all occupants 
were out of the vehicle and had embarked on another 
venture. This activity was unrelated to riding in a car. No 
guest vehicle was moving. 
POINT IV 
CRAIG FUHRIMAN'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE CAUSE 
OF THE INJURY AND DEATH OF BLAINE ORVEL 
SWEAT. 
The negligence of Craig Fuhriman which contributed 
to the injury and death of Blaine Orvel Sweat can be sum-
marized as follows: 
1. Although he was an experienced driver he ran out 
of gas on a main arterial highway. (His deposition Page 13, 
lines 14 through 17.) 
2. Left wheels of his car were parked on the black top 
portion of the highway when the car was abandoned. (De-
position of Trooper Giles, Page 9, lines 9 through 11, Page 
15, lines 15 through 25, Page 16, lines 1 through 5.) 
3. No lights were left on the car at any time. (His dep-
osition, Page 44, lines 13 through 15.) 
4. Knew how gasoline was to be siphoned from one 
motor vehicle to another and did not object. (His deposition 
Page 95, lines 14 through 22.) 
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5. Permitted a sixteen year old driver to park on the 
wrong side of the highway facing on-coming traffic. (His 
deposition Page 56, lines 20 and 21.) 
6. Failed to put out any warning signals or devices 
of any kind. (His deposition Page 59, lines 1 through is, 
Page 96 lines 20 through 25 and Page 97, lines 1 through 
16.) 
7. After the Jeep was stopped he stood to the rear of 
the Jeep to observe traffic. (His deposition Page 44, line 
11.) 
8. He failed to observe on-coming traffic as soon as he 
should have done under the circumstances. (His deposition 
Page 78, lines 22 through 25, and Page 79, lines one and 
two.) 
9. Failed to inform approaching traffic of the danger-
ously parked vehicles. (His deposition Page 27, lines 2 
through 6.) 
10 He permitted the traffic approaching the parked 
vehicles to approach so close before giving warning that 
he was able to run only a couple of steps before he was 
struck by the Jeep which had been hit by the Sargent car. 
(His deposition, Page 38, lines 3 and 4.) 
"Failure to observe is negligence proximately con-
tributing to harm where, by observing, driver 
have avoided or lessened resulting harm." 
Morris v. Christensen, 356 P2d, 34; 11U2d140. 
8 
"A motorist's duty of lookout is not fulfilled by 
merely taking a quick glance, or none." 
Hughes v. Hooper, 431 P2d 983, 19 Utah 2d 389. 
POINT V 
CRAIG FUHRIMAN IS LIABLE FOR THE INJURY 
AND DEATH OF BLAINE ORVEL SWEAT UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
All the elements of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance 
are present in this case. 
Sweat was in a position of peril. He could not see the 
on-coming car lights. See affidavit of Ranquist. 
Defendant Craig F)Ihriman was watching for on-com-
ing traffic (his deposition, page 44, line 11) but he failed 
to give a warning in time. He himself was only able to run 
a couple of steps (his deposition, page 38, line 4) before he 
was hit by the Jeep which had been struck by the Sargent 
car. 
Blaine Sweat was struck by the Sargent vehicle while 
standing between the vehicles trying to syphon gas into 
the Fuhriman car and died as a result of the injuries. 
Mr. Fuhriman was twenty-one (21) years of age with 
five (5) years of driving experience, driving his father's 
automobile. He had contributed to the dangerous situation, 
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but he, alone, had the Last Clear Chance to avoid the acci-
dent by giving adequate warning of approach of the Sar-
gent vehicle from the East, this he failed to do. The Allison 
boy, having a mouth full of gas, was clearing his mouth and 
nose of the gas and its fumes. Blaine Orvel Sweat was con-
centrating on syphoning gas, but Craig Fuhriman and his 
passenger were standing looking to the East toward the 
approaching car with a full knowledge of the peril of 
Blaine Sweat. Such conduct is a breach of the Doctrine of 
Last Clear Chance. 
Section 480 of the Retatement of Torts states the pro-
visions of the Last Clear Chance, such as are applicable in 
this case, as follows: 
"A plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance could have observed the danger created 
by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoid-
ed harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if the 
defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and 
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the plain-
tiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely to dis-
cover his peril in time to avoid the harm, and (c) 
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with 
reasonable care and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff." 
The terminology of his Section has been adopted by 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Graham v. Johnson, 166 P, 2d 230; 
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 120 Utah 453; 
235 P. 2d 515. 
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A complete discussion of the Doctrine of Last Clear 
Chance and its application is found in 92 ALR 47, supple-
mented in 119 ALR 1041, and 171 ALR 365. 
In the case of Graham v. Johnson, 169 P. 2d 230, at 
Page 238, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated: 
" ... In situations where reasonable minds must all 
come to the conclusion that a defendant had ample 
opportunity to utilize an existing ability to avoid 
harm to the plaintiff the court should direct aver-
dict for the plaintiff; in situations where reasonable 
minds must all conclude that a defendant did not 
have such opportunity the verdict should be direct-
ed for the defendant ... " 
It is claimed that Blaine Sweat was negligent in plac-
ing himself between the two automobiles to siphon gas or 
negligent in failing to see the approaching Sargent car, as-
suming but not admitting the negligence of Sweat, the 
subsequent negligence of Craig Fuhriman brings the hu-
manitarian Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance into being. 
"Even though a plaintiff was negligent, if defendant 
had last clear chance to avoid accident, plaintiff was 
entitled to recover damages, notwithstanding his 
own negligence. 
"Plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding his own 
negligence if he is in a situation of inextricable 
peril and defendant either knows, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care should know of such peril, and 
thereafter has a clear opportunity to avoid the in-
jury or fails to do so, since under such circumstances 
plaintiff's negligence has in a sense come to rest 
and is not a concurring approximate cause of in-
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jury, but negligence of defendant is later, interven-
ing sole proximate cause." 
Marcellin v. Osgthorpe, 336 Ped 779, 9 Utah 2d 1. 
In the case of Jones v. Knudson, 400 Ped 562, 16 Utah 
2d 332, this court held that if a jury could find the neces-
sary facts for the application of the Doctrine of Last Clear 
Chance that plaintiff's contributory negligence would be 
irrelevant. 
The case of Beckstrom v. Williams, 282 P2d 309, 3 
Utah 2d 210 also holds that a negligent plaintiff may re-
cover under the theory of Last Clear Chance. See also 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 282 P2d 335, 
3 Utah 2d, 247. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, plaintiffs submit that 
their motion for summary judgment should have been 
granted, particularly as to defendant Craig Fuhriman, and 
that the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment should be reversed, or in the alter-
native the plaintiff should be granted a right to trial on 
the issues. 
J HAROLD CALL 
Attorney for Appellants 
23 Center Street 
Heber City, Utah 
